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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW -

PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS AND ALTERNATIVES

TO THE OBJECTIVE TEST

INTRODUCTION

Under the fourth amendment, I every citizen has the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. This right is jeopard
ized when law enforcement officers use a pretextual arrest as an excuse
for carrying out a search that is otherwise illegal. For the purpose of
this note, a pretextual arrest will be defined as a legal arrest carried out
for an illegal purpose. 2 A "classic example ... occurs when an officer
stops a driver for a minor traffic violation in order to investigate a
hunch that the driver is engaged in illegal" activity.3 A pretextual
arrest presents a unique threat to those rights guaranteed by the fourth
amendment because, as one judge observed, pretextual arrests trans
form a common traffic ticket into a "one-time pass" to violate the
fourth amendment requirement of probable cause. 4
Traditionally, courts have responded to pretextual arrests by in
voking the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is designed to al
low judges to suppress evidence from arrests that violate the
1. The fourth amendment of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. See Burkhoff, Pretext Searches, 19 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REP. no.4 at 25
(1982); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) ("A pretextual stop
occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person
or place ... for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to support a stop.").
3. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515.
4. United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1186 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, J.,
concurring). See also United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) (A
pretextual arrest "serves as a means to circumvent the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. ").
105
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constitution. 5 In order to determine if a given arrest is unconstitu
tional, the courts currently use an objective test that examines only the
conduct of the arresting officers. 6 If the officers' actions, viewed with
out regard for their sUbjective intent, are found to be unreasonable, the
exclusionary rule may be applied to block admission of the evidence.
Motive is not a factor in the objective test, for, as one court put it, "an
objectively reasonable seizure does not violate the Constitution despite
the officer's bad intent."7
The objective test provides an effective method of identifying non
pretextual arrests that violate the fourth amendment. The test, how
ever, fails to identify pretextual arrests because the test ignores the
motives of the arresting officers, and, with pretextual arrests, it is the
motives of the officers, not their conduct, which are illegal. 8 The pur
pose of this note is to examine the weaknesses inherent in the objective
test and to propose a modification of the test that addresses these
weaknesses. This new test has two steps. The first preserves the cur
rent objective standard in order to address non-pretextual arrests. The
second step involves a separate balancing test which weighs the bene
fits of admitting potentially important evidence against the costs to the
integrity of the judicial system of tolerating improper law enforcement
behavior.9
Part I of this note traces the development of the objective test,
showing how the Supreme Court originally used a subjective test in
United States v. Lefkowitz 10 and why this test was eventually replaced
by the objective test in Scott v. United States. ll Part II focuses on a
single case, United States v. Causey,12 which serves as an example of
two different ways in which the objective test has been applied in the
5. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-83 (1976).
6. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978).
7. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987).
8. The objective test upholds any arrest which has an objectively valid basis. By
definition, a pretextual arrest is a valid arrest for an invalid reason. Therefore, by defini
tion, all pretextual arrests will pass the objective test. See infra note 44 and accompanying
text.
9. This second step is based on an alternative rationale for the exclusionary rule. The
primary justification for the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Preserving the
integrity of the judicial system is a secondary rationale. The first step of the proposed test
is based on deterrence in order to discourage illegal conduct. The second step is based on
the judicial integrity rationale and seeks to protect the legal system as a whole from the
effects of police misconduct. See infra notes 177-191 and accompanying text.
10. 285 U.S. 452, 463-67 (1932). See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Lefkowitz.
II. 436 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1978). See infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Scott.
12. 818 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987)·(en banc).
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context of pretextual arrests. Part III analyzes alternative tests ad
vanced by Professors Wayne LaFave and John Burkhotf. This note
applies these alternative standards to the facts of Causey in order to
measure their effectiveness in identifying pretextual arrests. Lastly,
this note presents a new approach and explains why it offers an im
proved standard by which to test pretextual arrests.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR IDENTIFYING
PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS

A.

The Subjective Standard

Prior to 1978, courts generally used a subjective standard to iden
tify pretextual arrests. 13 This standard focused on police intent. A
court using the sUbjective standard would examine the factual circum
stances of a case and attempt to determine the arresting officers' mo
tives. If the court concluded that law enforcement officers acted with
an illegal motive, the court would find the arrest pretextual and there
fore illegal. The exclusionary rule would be invoked to suppress the
evidence. 14
The earliest example of the older SUbjective standard is United
States v. Lefkowitz. ls While Lefkowitz did not involve a pretextual
arrest as defined in this note, the Supreme Court did state that "[a]n
arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence," and this
statement has frequently been cited in pretextual arrest cases. 16 A
more detailed explanation of the Supreme Court's pre-Scott position,
however, appears in Abel v. United StatesP In Abel, the defendant
claimed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had arranged
for the Immigration Service to carry out an administrative arrest so
13. See United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1970); Amador-Gonza
lez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 1968); Massachusetts v. Painten, 368 F.2d
142, 143-44 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 931 (1967), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 560
(1968); United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp. 871, 874-76 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
14. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961). For a discussion
of Taglavore, see infra notes 20-26.
15. 285 U.S. 452, 463-67 (1932). In Lefkowitz, law enforcement officers arrested the
defendant under a valid warrant. The federal agents went beyond the scope of the issued
warrant and carried out a general exploratory search for evidence. Id. at 458. The Court
found that the search was done outside of the agents' proper authority. Id. at 463-67.
Courts have cited Lefkowitz as authority for excluding evidence obtained through a pretex
tual arrest. See, e.g., Blazak v. Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (D. Ariz. 1971).
16. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. at 467.
17. 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960). See Burkhoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
70 (1982); I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e), at 90-97 (1987); Burkhoff, Pre
text Searches, supra note 2, at 25.
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that the FBI could search for evidence pertaining to a different matter.
In dicta the Court stated:
The deliberate use by the Government of an administrative warrant
for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case must meet
stern resistance by the courts. The preliminary stages of a criminal
prosecution must be pursued in strict obedience to the safeguards
and restrictions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. IS

In line with the Supreme Court's statements in Lefkowitz and
Abel, lower courts adopted the subjective test. 19 A specific example of
the subjective test can be seen in a Ninth Circuit case, Taglavare v.
United States. 20
In Taglavare, vice squad officers, suspecting a man of possessing
marijuana,21 obtained warrants relating to two prior traffic violations.
The officers waited until they believed that the defendant had drugs in
his possession. 22 Then, while serving the warrants, they saw the de
fendant put something into his mouth. The officers threw the defend
ant down, and one sat on his stomach while the other choked the
defendant and pulled the remains of a marijuana cigarette out of his
mouth. 23
The court held that the evidence was inadmissible. From the
facts of the case, the court inferred that the police had "engaged in a
deliberate scheme to evade the requirements of the Fourth Amend
ment."24 The court stated that "[w]here the arrest is only a sham or a
front being used as an excuse for making a search, the arrest itself and
the ensuing search are illegal. "25 The court explained the reason be
hind its decision, saying: "Were the use of misdemeanor arrest war
rants as a pretext for searching people suspected of felonies to be
permitted, a mockery could be made of the Fourth Amendment and
its guarantees. The courts must be vigilant to ... prevent such a mis
use of legal processes. "26
The sUbjective test, however, has been criticized for two reasons:
18. Abel, 362 U.S. at 226.
19. Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308,315 (5th Cir. 1968); Blazak v.
Eyman, 339 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (D. Ariz. 1971); United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F. Supp.
871,874-76 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1975).
20. 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961).
21. Id. at 264.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 267.
25. /d. at 265.
26. Id. at 266.
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first, motives are often difficult to ascertain,27 and second, the fourth
amendment proscribes only unreasonable conduct, not unreasonable
motives. Based largely on the latter reason, the Supreme Court aban
doned the sUbjective approach in Scott v. United States. 28
B.

The Objective Standard

In 1978, in Scott v. United States, the Supreme Court established
the objective standard, which switched the primary focus from intent
to conduct. While the Scott case did not involve a pretextual arrest, its
holding has set the standard for determining when an arrest violates
the fourth amendment. 29
In Scott, the Federal Bureau of Investigation obtained a warrant
to tap the phone lines of suspected drug dealers.30 As required by the
federal wiretapping statute,3l the warrant required the FBI "to mini
mize the interception of communications that are [not] otherwise sub
ject to interception."32 The agents were aware of the statute's
requirements, "but made no attempt to comply therewith," and taped
all the defendants' telephone calls. 33 The defendants moved to have
the tapes excluded because the agents had knowingly violated the re
strictions imposed by the warrant. 34
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist,
stated that the constitutionality of fourth amendment activity should
be judged objectively. The Court noted that, "almost without excep
27. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 2\0,463 A.2d 320 (1983), cerro denied, 465 U.S. \030
(1984). The Bruzzese court stated:
We believe that it places an unfair burden on law enforcement authorities. Delv
ing into the so-called ulterior motives of policemen penalizes officers who out
wardly behave in a constitutionally appropriate way .... [A] defendant ... may
receive a windfall because the searching police officer harbored bad thoughts, de
spite the fact that those thoughts did not alter the external effects of the officer's
action.
Id. at 222, 463 A.2d at 327. The Bruzzese court also criticized the subjective test for being
unpredictable, noting that motives are often difficult to identify and that each court may
have different views of what constitutes the arresting officer's "true" intentions. Id. at 221,
463 A.2d at 326.
28. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
29. Lester V. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, \08 S. Ct. 355 (1987); United States
V. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987); United States V. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845
(1st Cir. 1980); State v. Malik, 201 N.J. Super. 114, 119-20,534 A.2d 27, 29 (1987).
30. Scott, 436 U.S. at 13 \.
3\. Id.
32. Id. at 131-32.
33. Id. at 133. Forty percent of the calls were related to narcotics deals. Id. at 132.
34. Id.
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tion," previous opinions dealing with fourth amendment violations
were based on an "objective" standard. The Court observed that the
courts of appeals had "generally followed these principles, first exam
ining [the arrest] ... under a standard of objective reasonableness
without regard to the underlying intent or motivation."35 Based on
this interpretation of precedent, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
determination of violations of the fourth amendment "turns on an ob
jective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and cir
cumstances confronting him at the time. "36
The Court believed that the sUbjective test should be discarded
because the intent of the arresting officers is constitutionally irrelevant.
Justice Rehnquist explained that "[s]ubjective intent alone ... does
not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional;"37 he
also wrote, "[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind
which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justifica
tion for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action."38 In
Scott, therefore, the Court rejected the sUbjective test and ruled that
the actions of law enforcement officers should be examined objectively
because the motives of the police officers have no bearing on the con
stitutionality of their acts.39
Following Scott, the Supreme Court has continued to use an ob
35. Scott, 436 u.s. at 137-38. This characterization of the holdings of Supreme
Court and courts of appeals decisions is at best questionable. See Note, Addressing the
Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amend
ment Violations, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 242-46 (1983); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, § l.4(e),
at 90-91; Burkhoff, supra note 17, at 74. Professor Burkhoff refers to the objective standard
as "mere dicta." Id. Professor Burkhoff argues that the cases used by the Scott Court do
not provide any support for Justice Rehnquist's statement. Id.
36. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 138.
39. Lower courts have adhered to this rationale. See, e.g., Lester v. Chicago, 830
F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987)
("As Scott' plainly states, the unchallenged premises that the deputies had probable cause to
and could lawfully arrest Basey ... render irrelevant any inquiry into the deputies' above
referenced alleged ulterior motivation."); People v. Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297,
523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that when of
ficers do no more than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their
motives in doing so are irrelevant and not subject to inquiry, and the results of their investi
gations are not to be suppressed."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1935 (1989); State v. Petty, 48
Wash. App. Ct. 615, 620, 740 P.2d 879, 882 (1987) ("[T]he constitutionality of the officer's
action is not undermined by the officer's reasons for approaching the house. An officer's
underlying intent or motivation is irrelevant to the judicial inquiry into the lawfulness of
the officer's conduct. ").
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jective standard in ruling on the constitutionality of arrests. 40 For ex
ample, in Maryland v. Macon,41 the defendant claimed that because an
undercover officer purchased obscene materials with the intent to use
them as evidence, the purchase was in fact a warrantless seizure. 42
Citing Scott, the Supreme Court said that the proper test is an objec
tive assessment of conduct, not "the officer's actual state of mind. "43
As a result, when called upon to decide the constitutionality of
allegedly pretextual arrests, most lower courts have employed the
Scott objective test. 44 "[C]ourts do not agree, however, on what objec
tive elements are dispositive in determining whether a pretextual intru
sion is unconstitutional."45 For example, the majority of courts follow
the test strictly and ignore the arresting officer's motives. 46 This note
will refer to this approach as the "strict objective" standard. Other
courts, however, overtly adopt the objective test, but actually use the
objective facts of the arrest as a means of determining the subjective
intent of the police. 47 This alternate method, referred to in this note as
See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3 (1983).
472 U.S. 463 (1985).
42. Id. at 470-71.
43. Id. at 470.
44. Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316 (2d. Cir.), em. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987); United States
v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845
(1st Cir. 1980); State v. Malik, 221 N.J. Super. 114, 120, 534 A.2d 27, 29 (1987). In some
instances, courts have ignored Scott and used the subjective test. In United States v. Keller,
499 F. Supp. 415 (N.D. III. 1980), an officer stopped a car for having only one license plate
because, in the officer's words, "many times a traffic violation does lead to bigger things."
[d. at 416. The Keller court, without citing Scott, rejected the contention "that ordinarily
an arrest is judged by 'an objective standard rather than by inquiring into the officer's
presumed motives.''' [d. at 417 (citation omitted). The Keller court refused to use the
objective test because such a test would uphold all pretextual arrests. By definition, a
pretextual arrest involves two different charges, the one the police are really interested in
and the minor charge used as a pretext. If this minor charge is legal, a court using the
objective test will find that the minor charge, no matter how trivial, satisfies the objective
test.
The court stated that "the [objective test] ... virtually eliminates the possibility of ever
proving a pretextual arrest. If every arrest were judged by an objective standard and up
held if there was a valid basis for arrest, then there could never be a pretextual arrest." Id.
The Keller court noted that an objective approach "rewards the officer for his subterfuge;
his pretextual stop successfully uncovers other incriminating conduct or evidence and then
the government is permitted to use that evidence." Id.
45. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, ISIS (10th Cir. 1988).
46. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985); United States v. Basey, 816
F.2d 980, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 (1st Cir. 1980);
State v. Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 495-96, 595 P.2d 1364, 1370 (I979).
47. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 756 n.4 (11th Cir. 1988), cerro denied, 109 S. Ct. 1137 (1989); United
States V. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316-17, (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987);
40.
41.
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the "modified objective" approach, appears in many ways to be the old
sUbjective test applied within the restrictions of the language of the
Scott decision. 48 Regardless of the test used, if an arrest is determined
to be unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule is invoked. 49 The recent
case of United States v. Causey 50 demonstrates the two different ways
the objective test has been applied.

II.

UNITED STATES V. CAUSEY

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued two decisions in the
Causey case. The first, Causey 1,51 was a unanimous three judge panel
decision. The second, Causey II,52 vacated Causey I following a re
hearing en banco Causey I, without dissent, applied the modified ob
jective standard. The Causey II majority used the strict objective
standard.
The facts of Causey were undisputed. Baton Rouge police re
ceived a tip that Reginald Causey had been involved in a bank rob
bery.53 Causey fit a description given by a bank teller. Additionally,
Causey had a record of prior bank robberies. The police realized that
their informant's tip was insufficient to establish probable cause for an
arrest, but they still wished to question Causey. 54 The officers checked
the city warrant book and found a seven-year-old default warrant for
failing to appear on a misdemeanor theft charge. While the statute of
limitations barring prosecution for the theft had passed, the statute of
limitations on the default warrant for failing to appear had not. After
a judge determined that the default warrant was still valid, the police
arrested Causey, read him his Miranda rights, and took him to the
station. There, they read him his rights again and questioned him. 55
According to Causey's testimony, the police informed him that, if
he were brought up before a state court, he might face not only the
United States v. Johnson, 815 F.2d 309,315 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1032
(1988).
48. See, e.g., Johnson, 815 F.2d at 315 (5th Cir. 1987) (When analyzing a possible
pretextual arrest, the appropriate inquiry is whether "a reasonable officer would not have
made the arrest absent illegitimate motive. ").
49. Note that the strict objective and modified objective tests are simply standards
used to evaluate whether an arrest is unconstitutional. If found unconstitutional, the exclu
sionary rule may be applied. See United States V. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1186-87 (5th Cir.
1987) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
50. 818 F.2d 354 (5th Cir.), rev'd. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
51. Id.
52. 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987).
53. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 355.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 356.
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robbery charge, but also separate charges under the state Habitual
Criminal Act. However, if he were to confess to the FBI and stand
trial on federal robbery charges only, his sentence might potentially be
shorter.56 Causey agreed to confess. The police called in the FBI who
asked Causey whether the police had threatened or promised him any
thing. Causey answered that the police had not threatened him, and
he confessed to the robbery.57 He was tried and convicted. Causey
appealed, claiming the arrest was an illegal pretext because at trial the
police testified that their only reason for arresting Causey was "to con
tinue the investigation of the bank robbery."58 A three' judge panel of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed his conviction. On rehear
ing en banc, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overruled
and vacated the earlier panel decision. 59

A.

Causey I

In Causey I, Judge Rubin, writing for a unanimous three judge
panel, found that Causey's arrest was a pretext and that evidence ob
tained as a result of it could be suppressed. 60 Judge Rubin identified
the issue before the court as whether a suspect's confession is admissi
ble when an officer arrests a suspect with a valid warrant, but with the
intent of interrogating the suspect for a different crime. 61
Judge Rubin acknowledged that Scott provided the proper stan
dard for resolving questions of pretextual arrests. 62 However, Judge
Rubin found that the arrest in Causey failed to pass the Scott objective
test because the arresting officers had no objectively valid reason to
arrest Causey on the default warrant. Judge Rubin cited United States
v. Basey 63 and United States v. Johnson,64 two cases in which the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals had previously applied the Scott test. Judge
Rubin found that in both, the facts indicated that the arrests were
objectively valid. For example, Judge Rubin was satisfied with the evi
dence that the police had acted in "good faith" in Basey; he concluded
that the law enforcement officers had acted within their "legitimate
interests" in Johnson. 65 Therefore, according to Judge Rubin, the ar
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

/d.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Causey 11,834 F.2d 1179, 1185 (5th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
Causey I, 818 F.2d at 355.
/d. at 358.
Id.
816 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1987).
815 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1032 (1988).
Causey I, 818 F.2d at 358. The Basey court held that the defendant's focus "on
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rests in Basey and Johnson were not pretextual.
In contrast with Basey and Johnson, Judge Rubin found that the
arrest in Causey must have been pretextual because there was no in
dependent basis for the investigation absent the warrant which was
issued for another charge. 66 He noted that "the objective facts and
circumstances would not have justified any officer in making the
arrest."67 Citing Lejkowitz 68 and Taglavore 69 as support, he con
cluded that, if the police "detain a suspect as a pretext to conduct a
search for which probable cause is lacking ... the subsequent search is
unconstitutional."70
The prosecutor argued that cases such as Lejkowitz and Taglavore
could be distinguished because these cases involved fourth amendment
searches and not fifth amendment confessions as in Causey.71 Judge
Rubin dismissed this argument as a "distinction without a differ
ence."72 Judge Rubin concluded that "[t]he degree of intrusiveness of
an arrest made as a pretext to question is not less than the degree of
intrusiveness of an arrest made as a pretext to search. "73
Judge Rubin then examined two contradictory Fifth Circuit
cases, Amador-Gonzalez v. United States 74 and United States v. Caval
lino. 75 In Amador-Gonzalez, a narcotics officer noticed the defendant
acting suspiciously near a car belonging to known drug dealers.76 The
officer followed the defendant and observed a few minor traffic viola
tions. The police stopped the defendant, and a search uncovered herthe officers' motive for the arrest misperceives the proper issue;" it then cited Scott in sup
port of a purely objective test considering only the officer's conduct. United States v. Ba
sey, 816 F.2d 980,990 (5th Cir. 1987). The Johnson court, on the other hand, advanced an
approach that would examine police motive. "If a reasonable officer would not have made
the arrest absent illegitimate motive, then the resulting search ... is unlawful." Johnson,
815 F.2d at 315 (5th Cir. 1987).
66. 818 F.2d at 358.
67. Id. at 359.
68. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). For a discussion of Lefkowitz,
see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
69. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of
Taglavore, see supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
70. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 359.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 360. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963) (holding
that the exclusionary rule applies equally to evidence from confessions and physical evi
dence). Id. at 485-88.
74. 391 F.2d 308, 316 (5th Cir. 1968). Amador-Gonzalez has been relied on by other
courts. See, e.g., United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 416 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
75. 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974).
76. Amador-Gonzalez, 391 F.2d at 310.
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oin. The defendant confessed to the charged drug offenses. 77 The
Amador-Gonzalez court concluded that the arrest was pretextual be
cause the officer searched the car for drugs even though the arrest was
technically for a traffic violation. 78 Cavallino was factually similar,
but reached an opposite result. 79 In Cavallino, the police chief ordered
two officers to follow a suspect and arrest him when he violated any
traffic ordinance. The officers did so, and the defendant eventually
confessed to an unrelated offense. 8o The court stated that the motives
of the officers were unimportant and upheld the constitutionality of
the confession because the officers had an objectively valid reason for
making the traffic arrest. 81
Judge Rubin expressed his concern that admitting evidence from
pretextual searches would encourage violations of fourth amendment
rights. He observed that Cavallino could be construed as suggesting
that police can use any excuse to arrest a person:
Cavallino permits the police intentionally to conjure up some pre
text to arrest a person and to use that arrest to conduct an interro
gation that the fourth amendment would otherwise prohibit. The
holding thus unintentionally encourages the development of police
state processes, whereby overzealous officers are permitted to ex
ploit any possible violation of some misdemeanor statute in order to
incarcerate citizens without regard for the individual's freedom. 82

Judge Rubin found that Amador-Gonzalez furnished the correct
standard because it prevented any use of evidence seized from a
pretextual arrest. Concluding that Cavallino was an aberration, 83
Judge Rubin determined that the decision of the Amador-Gonzalez
court was more consistent with both Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent. 84
Judge Rubin held that, in light of Amador-Gonzalez, the arrest of
Reginald Causey was a pretext and that evidence obtained as a result
of the arrest was subject to the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary
rule, however, does not autoJ?atically require the suppression of all
Id. at 310-11.
78. Id. at 315.
79. 498 F.2d 1200, 1201-03 (5th Cir. 1974).
80. Id. at 1201-03.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d 354, 360 (5th Cir.), rev'd, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th
Cir. 1987) (en bane).
83. Id. at 361.
84. Id. at 360-61.
77.
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illegal evidence. 85 With confessions, the accepted procedure is to eval
uate the evidence under the four point test of Brown v. Illinois 86 to
determine if the Miranda warnings attenuate the taint that results
from the illegal arrest. 87 Judge Rubin found that, in Causey, there
were no intervening events that broke the causal chain from arrest to
confession. Furthermore, he held that the law enforcement officers'
actions were a deliberate attempt to circumvent constitutional protec
tions and were "a 'flagrantly abusive' violation of Fourth Amendment
rights. "88 As a result, the confession was inadmissible. He concluded
that "[t]he police deliberately set out to interrogate [Causey] by em
ploying a method that violated his constitutional rights. The evidence
thus obtained is as tainted as if it had been obtained by coercion, bru
tality, or any other unconstitutionallever."89
B.

Causey fL· The Strict Objective Standard

The en banc circuit court in Causey II vacated the panel's deci
sion in Causey I. The en banc court found that, objectively, the con
duct of the police was not a violation of Causey's constitutional rights
and that, after Scott, it was inappropriate to examine an arresting of
ficer's intentions. 90 Judge Gee noted that the reason for the rehearing
en banc was to resolve a possible conflict between Scott and the Causey
I court's holding "that conduct otherwise lawful in every respect on
the part of the police is rendered unconstitutional by their irregular
subjective intent alone."91 Judge Gee also criticized Causey I for ad
ding a new requirement to the analysis for determining a confession's
admissibility. Previously, the admission of confessions had been con
trolled by the constitutional voluntariness standard and the Supreme
Court's Miranda requirements. 92 In addition to these limitations, ac
cording to Judge Gee, the Causey I "panel added an additional re
quirement that the police who took the confessor lawfully into custody
85. Id.
86. 422 u.s. 590, 610 (1975).
87. Id. Meeting the Miranda requirements does not in itself result in admission of a
confession obtained from an illegal arrest. Four criteria have to be met in order to remove
the "taint" caused by the arrest. These include voluntariness, the time lag between the
arrest and confession, any intervening events, and the degree of official misconduct. Id. at
603-04.
88. Causey I, 818 F.2d at 361-62 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610
(1975».
89. Id. at 362-63.
90. Causey II, 834 F.2d at 1182-85.
91. Id. at 1180.
92. Id.
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must not have done so with improper motive. "93
Judge Gee's opinion stressed that the police conduct in the Causey
case was lawful. It was only the intentions of the arresting officers that
caused the panel court to declare the arrest illegal. 94 Judge Gee took
issue with the panel's use of authority, particularly Amador-Gonza
lez. 95 In a footnote, he pointed out that the opinion of the Amador
Gonzalez court, that Judge Rubin cited as support for his position in
Causey 1,96 was not endorsed by the full panel in Amador-Gonzalez. 97
Additionally, according to Judge Gee, the Amador-Gonzalez majority
qualified its decision saying:
The pretextual motivation did not vitiate the validity of the
arrest. ... Proof that a traffic arrest was only a pretext to search for
evidence of another offense is significant legally only because it bears
on the reasonableness of the search ... the emphasis is on the objec
tive relationship between the nature of the offense and the nature
(circumstances) of the search, rather than on the motivational cause
of the arrest. 98

Judge Gee concluded that, under Amador-Gonzalez, the focus of judi
cial inquiry is not on the motives of the officers but on the objective
reasonableness of the search. Citing Scott, he stated:
Again and again, in precisely the present context, the Court has told
us that where the police officers are objectively doing what they are
legally authorized to do-as in arresting Causey ... their investiga
tions are not to be called in question on the basis of any subjective
intent with which they acted. 99

Judge Gee held that Causey's confession was admissible, observing
that Causey had been repeatedly read his Miranda rights and that this
procedure indicated the objective reasonableness of the arresting of
ficers' actions.lOo Judge Gee concluded that, as long as the actions of
the law enforcement officers were lawful, their motivations were of
"no consequence."l0l
Id.
Id. at 1181.
Id. at 1181-82.
In Causey I, 818 F.2d at 361, Judge Rubin stated that Amador-Gonzalez held
arrests unconstitutional." Id. at 1182 n.6.
Id.
98. Id. (quoting Amador-Gonzalez, 391 F.2d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 1968) (emphasis ad
ded in Judge Gee's opinion».
99. Id.
100. Id.
10 I. Id. at 1185.
93.

94.
95.
96.
"pretext
97.
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Judge Higginbotham concurred in the use of the objective test,
but emphasized two separate points. First, he pointed out that there
was no evidence that the police had stored or "warehoused" the war
rant for use in later arrests. 102 Judge Higginbotham was concerned
that, if this had been the case, old warrants would be used "to pocket a
one-time pass to the strictures of the fourth amendment."103 He
warned that the court's holding was not to be construed as tolerating
storing of old warrants for this purpose. 104
Second, Judge Higginbotham stressed that the warrant was vali
dated by a magistrate. According to Judge Higginbotham, a warrant
is presumed to be reasonable if it is issued by a neutral magistrate on
sufficient probable cause.105 He noted that the fact that "the police
may have been motivated to execute the warrant for reasons extrinsic
to the offense ordinarily is irrelevant so long as there is probable cause
for the arrest."106 Because the judge issued the warrant on sufficient
probable cause, the warrant was presumed to be within the "circle of
objective reasonableness."107 This presumption of reasonableness can
only be overcome by objective evidence to the contrary, which Judge
Higginbotham believed was lacking. 108
Six judges joined in Judge Rubin's dissent in Causey II. The dis
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1186.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The presence of a judge in the warrant process raises important questions.
Arguably, if a judge issues a warrant, it is improper to apply the exclusionary rule to subse
quent acts of law enforcement officers. The primary justification for excluding evidence is
deterrence. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). The deterrence ra
tionale is predicated on the belief that suppressing evidence from illegal arrests will prevent
police misconduct, not judicial misconduct. The Supreme Court has noted that it is inap
propriate to apply the deterrence rationale to judicial acts. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 916 (1984) ("[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather
than to punish the errors of judges.... Most important[ly], we discern no basis ... for
believing that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant
deterrent effect on the issuing judge."); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 179,519 A.2d
820, 868 (1987) (Garibaldi, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If a police officer
acting in an objectively reasonable manner secures a warrant from a judge and in good faith
believes he has complied with constitutional requirements, what more can we ~xpect of
him?"). As a result, it is illogical to use the exclusionary rule to deter law officers when
they are acting under judicial direction (as in the case of a warrant) inasmuch as the pri
mary justification for the exclusionary rule is to deter the police, not the judiciary. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 498 (1976) (Burger, c.J., concurring) ("Once the warrant issues,
there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law.").
108. Amador-Gonzalez, 834 F.2d at 1186.
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sent expressed apprehension about the likely results of applying the
objective test strictly:
By holding the arrest in Causey constitutional, the majority opinion
establishes a new rule that makes the whole more than the sum of
its parts: the police can take two bases for arrest, each constitution
ally insufficient-an unreasonable and arbitrary execution of a war
rant and a suspicion amounting to less than probable cause-and
add them together as a basis for a constitutionally acceptable
arrest. 109

The dissent also feared that allowing the police to use pretextual
tactics could result in routine abuse of constitutional rightS. IIO Any
minor warrant would serve as an excuse for avoiding the fourth
amendment restrictions on unreasonable searches and seizures. I I I As
Judge Rubin said: "Police who desire to arrest an individual without
probable cause may merely leaf through the files or tum to the com
puter to determine whether they can ... arrest a suspect."1l2 The
dissent concluded that "many millions will be exposed to pretextual
arrest by virtue of the majority opinion" because of failure to pay
parking tickets. 113
The dissent claimed that the objective facts "mandate the conclu
sion that the arrest was but a means to take Causey into custody in
order to question him about an offense other than the one for which he
was arrested."114 According to the dissent, the objective facts of the
case demonstrated the existence of an improper motive for the
arrest. I IS In addition, the simple fact that the arresting officers devi
ated from standard departmental procedures indicated that they were
not acting in good faith.116
The dissent acknowledged that the Scott objective standard was
controlling,117 but applied the test in a different way from the major
ity. The dissent believed Causey's arrest was illegal because the arrest
ing officers lacked an objectively valid reason to arrest him in the first
place. I IS Because the facts indicated that the police could not have
109.
llO.
lli.
ll2.
ll3.
114.
llS.
ll6.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1188-89 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
ll89-90.
1190.
-1189.

at
at
at
at
at

1186.
1187-88.
ll88.
ll87.
1188.
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had a legal motive to conduct the arrest, the dissent inferred that the
police acted with an illegal motive. 119 Citing the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals for support, the court reasoned that the Scott test is
"an examination of what a reasonable officer would do. When, as
here, a reasonable officer would not have made the seizure of the sus
pect's person absent an invalid purpose, the arrest must be condemned
as pretextual." 120 In essence, the dissent contended that the absence of
a legitimate motive can be demonstrated objectively by examining the
circumstances known to the arresting officers. If no persuasive reason
for making the arrest is found, the courts may infer an invalid motive
and find the arrest pretextualPI
The dissent also noted the unusual circumstances of the arrest.
According to Judge Rubin, the Supreme Court has upheld searches as
long as there is no evidence of "bad faith" on the part of the arresting
officers.122 The dissent stated that bad faith can be demonstrated if the
officers depart from standard procedures in conducting the arrest. 123
"When standard practices, not themselves unlawful, are followed, the
police are acting in a fashion that is reasonable, objectively viewed,
even if they have an ulterior motive. Here the police were clearly not
following standard procedures. And they were not acting in good
faith-objective or subjective."124 In the dissent's view, "[t]heir devia
tion from their usual practice without just cause made their conduct
arbitrary."125

III.

ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATE ApPROACHES

The majority of courts apply the strict objective test for three rea
sons. First, the strict objective test is based solely on an analysis of
conduct and is therefore more consistent with the Supreme Court's
language in Scott. 126 Second, the strict objective test is easier to apply
than the SUbjective test because it avoids "a costly and time-consuming
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1187 (citing United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709·11 (11th Cir.
1986». Judge Rubin also quoted the Johnson court: "If a reasonable officer would not
have made the arrest absent illegitimate motive, then the resulting search or inventory ...
is unlawful." Id. (quoting Johnson, 815 F.2d at 315).
121. Causey II, 834 F.2d at 1186-89.
122. Id. at 1187 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973».
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. The dissent concluded that "the police activity would not have been under
taken but for the" improper motive, and therefore was illegal. Id.
126. Scott, 436 U.S. at 137·38.
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expedition into the state of mind of the law enforcement officers."127
Lastly, Scott makes it clear that the alternative motive-based tests are
theoretically indefensible. 128 For example, the exclusionary rule is in
voked when an arrest is found to be unconstitutional. An arrest is
unconstitutional only if the arresting officer violates some constitu
tional requirement. According to Scott, bad motives do not violate the
fourth amendment. 129 Bad motives, therefore, do not make an arrest
unconstitutional. 130 As Justice Rehnquist observed in Scott, the fact
that the officer lacks the proper motivation "does not invalidate the
action taken."131 The theoretical weakness of sUbjective tests is that
they examine motives, and, after Scott, motives do not determine the
validity of an arrest. Therefore, the subjective test is focused on a fac
tor that is not relevant to the question before the court. As one court
explained: "An officer's underlying intent or motivation is irrelevant
to the judicial inquiry."132
The objective approach, however, also has several weaknesses. As
the Causey I court pointed out, a strict application of the objective test
allows law enforcement officers to use any trivial excuse, such as a
traffic violation, as a means of arresting and interrogating a suspect for
a crime for which probable cause does not exist. 133 As one judge ex
127. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 221-22, 463 A.2d 320,326-27 (1983). TheBroz
zese court observed that intent-based standards require the courts to engage in expensive
and unnecessary examination of the psychology of individual officers. Id. In addition, the
court noted that individuals may have several motives for a given action, further hindering
the application of any subjective test. Id. Lastly, the court stated that the precedential
value of such decisions would be limited because each case would be as unique as the
intentions of the arresting officers themselves. Id. See United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836,
846 (1st Cir. 1980) ("[T]he difficulty of applying a subjective standard would be
monumental. ").
128. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136-38.
129. Id. at 136. See also State v. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 620, 740 P.2d 879, 882
(1987) ("[T]he constitutionality of the officer's action is not undermined by the officer's
reasons. ").
130. See People v. Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297, 523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040
(1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that when police officers do no more
than they are objectively authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so
are irrelevant and not subject to inquiry, and the results of their investigations are not to be
suppressed.") (citing United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 1935 (1989». See also United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 991 (5th Cir. 1987)
("As Scott plainly states, the unchallenged premises that the deputies had probable cause to
and could lawfully arrest [the suspect] ... render irrelevant any inquiry into the deputies'
... alleged ulterior motivation."); Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 712 (7th Cir. 1987).
131. Scott, 436 U.S. at 138.
132. State V. Petty, 48 Wash. App. 615, 620, 740 P.2d 879, 882 (1987).
133. Causey II, 834 F.2d at 1186-89 (strict objective test allows law enforcement
officers to "find some reasons to arrest a suspect for whose arrest they otherwise lack prob
able cause."); United States V. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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pressed it, the objective standard "converts an arrest warrant for any
offense, no matter how minor or unrelated, into a skeleton key for
every suspect's home."134 In addition, the strict objective test "virtu
ally eliminates the possibility of ever proving a pretextual arresC'13S
To prove that an arrest is a pretext under the strict objective test, it is
necessary to demonstrate that there is absolutely no valid basis for the
arrest. Yet, with a pretextual arrest, there will always be at least one
valid reason. A pretextual arrest is, by definition, made up of two
different charges: the serious charge for which the officers lack prob
able cause and the trivial, but valid, charge being used as a pretext.
Because the objective test will uphold an arrest if there is one legiti
mate charge and a pretextual arrest always has one legitimate charge,
the objective test will uphold all arrests,136
To avoid the problems associated with the strict objective test,
some judges use a modified approach similar to Judge Rubin's Causey
I standard. 137 This approach limits judges to evaluating objective evi
dence only, but also allows them to use such evidence to infer motive.
Using the language of the objective test, this approach examines mo
tives like the subjective test. But, it falls prey to the same weaknesses
as the subjective approach because, as Scott made clear, motives are
not relevant to the question of whether an arrest is acceptable under
the fourth amendment.138 The modified objective test also punishes
police officers who stay within the letter of the law. With the modified
approach, an officer who conscientiously obeys the law can find the
evidence from his arrests suppressed if a court decides that he acted
with bad motive. 139 Lastly, as with the old subjective test, the modi
fied objective test requires the court to engage in the unreliable process
134. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 252, 463 A.2d at 343 (1983) (Pollock, J., dissenting).
135. United States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp. 415, 417 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
136. Id. at 417. As the court stated in Keller:
If every arrest were judged by an objective standard and upheld if there was a
valid basis for the arrest, then there could never be a pretextual arrest. The con
cept assumes that there is a basis for the arrest, but that the arrest is made for the
purpose of conducting a search for which there would not otherwise be a
justification.
Id. See United States v. Zukas, 843 F.2d 179, 182 n.l (5th Cir. 1988) (Causey "validated
so-called pretextual arrest warrants."), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1742 (1989).
137. United States V. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988); State V. Nerse
sian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1316-17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 357 (1987); United States v.
Johnson, 815 F.2d 309,315 (5th Cir. 1982).
138. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136-38. For a discussion of Scott, see supra notes 29-39 and
accompanying text.
139. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 222, 463 A.2d at 326-27 ("Delving into the ... motives of
policemen penalizes officers who outwardly behave in a constitutionally appropriate
way.").
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of examining the thoughts of the arresting officers. l40
Concerned with the deficiencies of the subjective and objective
approaches, Professors Wayne LaFave and John Burkhoff have ad
vanced their own alternatives. Section A of Part III discusses these
alternatives. Section B of Part III proposes a new standard suggested
by a New Jersey case. This new approach has two steps. The first step
is an application of the strict objective standard. 141 The second step
balances the cost of suppressing valuable evidence against the cost to
the judicial system of tolerating police misconduct. 142
A.

Two Academic Alternatives to the Strict Objective Standard
1.

Wayne LaFave: The "Standard Procedures" Test

Under Professor Wayne LaFave's test, if a given arrest is contrary
to standard police practice, then the arrest is objectively arbitrary and
unconstitutional. 143 The basis of Professor LaFave's test is the notion
that the fourth amendment is primarily concerned with unreasonable
searches and seizures. l44 A search is unreasonable if it is arbitrary. If
the actions of the law enforcement officers are contrary to normal pro
cedure, the arrest is arbitrary and a violation of the fourth
amendment. 145
This test has the virtue of being easy to apply. Under the LaFave
approach, a judge only has to decide what constitutes normal law en
forcement practices and then determine whether the arresting officers
deviated from it. For example, in Causey, as well 'as in Taglavore 146
and Cavallino,147 police from one department, contrary to normal pro
cedure, executed warrants normally entrusted to an entirely different
140. Id. For a discussion of Bruzzese, see infra notes 167-82 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of the proposed test, see infra notes 167-99.
142. For a discussion of the second step to the proposed test, see infra notes 183-99.
143. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 90-97.
144. Judge Rubin cited Professor LaFave's test in Causey 1,818 F.2d at 358, and in
Causey II, 834 F.2d 1187-88. LaFave has been cited in several cases. See, e.g., United
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845
n.12 (1st Cir. 1980).
145. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 96. Professor LaFave recommends
the "more widespread application of the requirement utilized by the Supreme Court in
South Dakota v. Opperman, namely, that the fourth amendment activity 'was carried out in
accordance with standard procedures in the local police department.''' Id. (citing South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976».
146. 291 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961). For a discussion of Taglavore, see supra notes 20
26 and accompanying text.
147. 498 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of Cavallino, see supra notes
79-81 and accompanying text.
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department. 148 Because this behavior was a deviation from the
norm,149 courts applying the LaFave standard would find these arrests
invalid. LaFave also argues that his approach encourages police de
partments to define their departmental regulations carefully and
responsibly. 150
Several courts and commentators, however, have criticized the
LaFave test. For example, in State v. Bruzzese, 151 the New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the LaFave test because the court believed
that it discourages police initiative. 152 In addition, academic sources
have criticized the test on theoretical grounds. 153 One criticism is that
LaFave's use of police regulations to determine the validity of an
arrest is applying a non-constitutional test to solve a constitutional
problem. 154 The constitutional question raised by the fourth amend
ment is whether an arrest is arbitrary or unreasonable, not whether it
is within police regulations. The LaFave standard is based on an anal
ysis of "normal police procedure," and police procedure is not, in it
self, relevant to the question of the constitutional validity of an arrest.
Additionally, there are difficulties in Professor LaFave's assump
148. Taglavore, 291 F.2d at 264. In Taglavore, the arresting officers were from the
vice squad yet the warrant was of the type normally written by traffic officers. Id.
149. Anderson v. State, 444 P.2d 239, 240-41 (Okla. Crim. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1017 (1969). The court stated:
The only. evidence that causes the Court alarm in this regard was the fact that a
Federal Narcotics Agent was with the arresting officer, and they were looking for
a similar car. It always creates suspicion in the Court's mind when a Federal Agent
is with a City Officer in making an arrest for a traffic violation ....
Id.
ISO. I W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, § 1.4(e), at 90-97. Note that Professor LaFave's
approach is essentially objective. It is based on an examination of the conduct of the arrest
ing officers, not their intent. Professor LaFave is generally supportive of the Scott objective
approach and is critical of those courts that still seek to invoke the subjective standard.
151. 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983).
152. Id. at 228, 463 A.2d at 330. The Bruzzese court stated:
We do not endorse the rule that a search shall be deemed unreasonable merely
because a police officer deviates from his department's standard operating proce
dure. This theory is espoused by Professor LaFave, in his Search and Seizure
treatise . . .. The adoption of such a rule would discourage police officers from
thinking and from exercising initiative .... It is impossible for a police depart
ment to envision and to develop standard operating procedures for all such situa
tions .... To hold that a policeman's conduct is unreasonable because it deviates
from standard procedure would penalize the best officers and discourage imagina
tive police ... work.
Id. See Burkhoff, supra note 17, at 108-09.
153. Burkhoff. supra note 17, at. 104-11. See Note, Addressing the Pretext Arrest
Problem: The Role ofSubjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amendment Viola
tions, 63 B.U.L. REV. 223, 256 (1983).
154. Id.
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tion that all deviations from departmental regulations are prima facie
evidence of a pretextual arrest. There are many reasons to deviate
from any standard set of rules, and not all are illegal. 155 For example,
the police may deviate from the rules in a specific arrest because it is
physically safer to do so. If the normal procedure is to approach the
suspect's front door, but the suspect in a particular case is known to
shoot at officers, it may be reasonable to try a different method. The
fact that police deviate from their normal routine does not mean that
such deviation is improper and certainly does not mean that the devia
tion violates the fourth amendment. As a result, the LaFave approach
is overinclusive.
At the same time, the LaFave approach is underinclusive. Police
observance of standard procedures does not alone guarantee protec
tion of a suspect's rights. Law enforcement actions may be within the
normal scope of police authority yet still result in a violation of a sus
pect's constitutional rights. For example, in certain circumstances, it
may be normal police procedure to carry out a body search of a sus
pect. This procedure, while within the authority of the arresting of
ficers, can violate the fourth amendment if carried out in an arbitrary
or Improper manner.
Applying the LaFave standard to the facts of Causey would prob
ably result in the exclusion of the confession. 156 Judge Rubin's dissent
in Causey II observed that the actions of the arresting officers were
"absolutely without precedent in the Baton Rouge police force."157
Because the officers' conduct was outside of normal police procedure,
the LaFave test would identify it as invalid and would trigger the ex
clusionary rule.
2.

John Burkhoff: The Limited Subjective Approach

Professor Burkhoff proposes a limited SUbjective standard. 15s
The Burkhoff test, like the subjective test and the newer modified ob
jective test, involves investigating the motives of law enforcement of
ficers. If it appears that the arresting officer acted with dual motives,
one motive legally sufficient and the other pretextual and illegal, Pro
fessor Burkhoff would admit the evidence because the legally sufficient
motive, by itself, adequately justifies the arrest. 159 Professor Burkhoff
155.

Burkhoff, supra note 17, at lOS. See Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 22S, 363 N.E.2d at

370.
156. SIS F.2d at 35S n.l3.
157. Causey II, S34 F.2d at IIS7.
ISS. See Burkhoff, supra note 17, at SI, 115.
159. Id. at 9S-101.

126

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:105

suggests that in these circumstances the bad motive is "latent" and not
acted upon. l60 According to Professor Burkhoff, a. bad motive, not
acted on, is "constitutionally irrelevant."161 For Professor Burkhoff,
an arrest violates the fourth amendment only if the officer is acting
solely on an improper motive. 162
Commentators have identified several difficulties with the
Burkhoff approach. One major weakness is the practical problem of
determining the "true" motivation of the police. '63 In State v. Bruz
zese, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted:
Since motives are seldom apparent or vocalized, there is little relia
ble evidence of them. Even where motives are evident, the analysis
may still pose problems. Complex creatures that they are, humans
usually have several motives.. A judge cannot and should not be
required to weigh the motives to determine which one guided the
officer's behavior. . . . A further weakness of the SUbjective ap
proach is that it is neither reliable nor predictable. Appellate courts
with views of human psychology different from those of the trial
court would no doubt be tempted to second-guess the latter's assess
ment of the searching policeman's "true" intentions. l64

Additionally, the Burkhoff test may encourage dishonesty. For
example, under the Burkhoff approach, if the arresting officers have at
least one valid motive for making an arrest, any illegitimate motives
are assumed to be latent, and evidence from their search is admissible.
Application of the Burkhoff test may encourage the arresting officers
to invent "valid" motives for their actions, perhaps after the fact.165
In addition, the Burkhoff test contradicts the Scott Court's conclusion
that the thoughts of arresting officers do not determine the constitu
tionality of their conduct. 166
160. Id.
161. Id. at 99.
162. Id. at 100-03. See Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 297, 523 N.E.2d at 1040.
163. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. at 221,463 A.2d at 326.
164. Id.
165. See United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980). The Arra
court noted "the difficulty of administering a standard which turns upon motivation." Id.
The Arra court cited Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 437 (1974), and stated that "motivation is a self-generating phenomenon. As
law enforcement personnel learn that a particular motivation is improper because it will
render an otherwise valid search invalid, they may not have difficulty convincing them
selves that their conduct was prompted not by the improper reason but by the proper
one.... " Arra, 630 F.2d at 845 n.12.
166. Scott, 436 U.S. at 132-36. See United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 991 (5th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Arra, 630 F.2d 836, 845 n.12 (1st Cir. 1980). Professor
Burkhoff's interpretation of Scott is different from that of other authorities. Burkhoff does
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There is another practical difficulty with Professor Burkhoff's
method. For an arrest to be a pretext there must be two different
charges-the minor pretext charge and the more serious one. The
very nature of a pretextual arrest ensures that there is at least one
legitimate, though pretextual, reason for the arrest. Professor
Burkhoff's method accepts an arrest if there is one valid reason sup
porting it. Because pretextual arrests invariably involve one valid
charge, the Burkhoff approach will uphold most pretextual arrests.
Applying the Burkhoff test to the facts of Causey would likely
result in admission of the defendant's confession. The default warrant
was valid, and the arresting officers could simply point to it as the
valid reason for their actions. Even if the court were to determine that
the officers also entertained improper motives, these would be classi
fied as "latent" under the Burkhoff analysis.
Because of the weaknesses in Professor Burkhoff's standard, as
well as the weaknesses noted previously in Professor LaFave's method
and in the SUbjective and objective tests, a different approach is
needed.
3.

The Proposed Two-Step Standard

A New Jersey case suggests another variation on the strict objec
tive test that opens the possibility of reconciling the concerns of advo
cates of both the subjective and objective approaches. In State v.
Bruzzese,167 'police arrested a burglary suspect on an old unrelated
warrant. 168 During the arrest, police seized evidence implicating the
suspect in the burglary. The trial court suppressed the evidence. 169
not believe Scott advocates a purely objective test for all fourth amendment situations. He
believes that the Scott Court admitted the evidence because, although the police had an
improper motive, it was not acted on. He reads the Court's finding that the wiretaps were
objectively reasonable as an implicit determination that the police's illegal intentions had
no effect on the eventual actions. Burkhoff, supra note 17, at 83-84.
167. 94 N.J. 210, 463 A.2d 320 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984).
168. Id. at 213-14, 463 A.2d at 322. The defendant was a suspect because the police
were aware that he had been in the area of the crime and had made comments to his friends
that he wanted to "get even" with his former employer for firing him. Id. Local police ran
a check on his criminal record and found an old arrest warrant. Id. Interestingly, at trial it
was determined that the police were unsure of the warrant's purpose. The court noted that
at no point during the entire case was anyone sure for what charge the defendant was
actually arrested. Id. at 245, 463 A.2d at 339. Four policemen used the warrant to make
an arrest and carry out a search. The defendant alleged that, although the "seizure was
objectively reasonable, it was unconstitutional because the ... arrest warrant served as a
mere pretext for the search of the defendant's horne." Id. at 219, 463 A.2d at 325. The
trial court held that the arrest was a pretext and suppressed the evidence. Id.
. 169. Id. at 215-16, 463 A.2d at 322-23.
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The appellate division affirmed 170 and, using a subjective test, con
cluded that the arrest was a pretext. l7l
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the appellate court cit
ing the Scott objective test.172 Judge Garibaldi commented:
We hold that the proper inquiry for determining the constitutional
ity of a search-and-seizure is whether the conduct of the law en
forcement officer who undertook the search was objectively
reasonable, without regard to his or her underlying motives or in
tent. We emphasize that the Fourth Amendment proscribes unrea
sonable actions, not improper thoughts. In determining whether a
police officer's actions are constitutional, we do not rely on the of
ficer's own sUbjective appraisal, but on an objective evaluation by a
neutral judicial authority.173

The Bruzzese court criticized the sUbjective standard,174 but also
acknowledged that the objective test has potential for abuse. The
court applied two limitations to the objective test to reduce this poten
tial. The first, and more important for the Bruzzese court, is that the
officer's conduct must be reasonable. "The requirement of reasonable
ness is not one without teeth."175 The Bruzzese court referred only
briefly to its second limitatiqn on the objective test. While emphasiz
ing the reasonableness requirement, the court cited an earlier decision
that held that, if a search is objectively valid, " 'the existence of other
defects that do not . . . impugn the integrity of the judicial process
170. Id. The appellate division used a subjective test observing that "the intent of
the police officers may be determinative of the validity of their arrests." Bruzzese, 187 N.J.
Super. at 443, 455 A.2d at 497.
171. Bruzzese, 187 N.J. Super. 446, 455 A.2d at 493.
172. Id. at 216-23, 463 A.2d at 323-27.
173. Id. at 219-20, 463 A.2d at 325. The dissent argued that Scott, which involved
only wiretaps, may not apply to actual invasions of the horne. The dissent voiced the con
cern that the objective test, if applied woodenly, results in injustice and observed that the
test "converts an arrest warrant for any offense, no matter how minor or unrelated, into a
skeleton key for every suspect's horne." Id. at 252, 463 A.2d at 343.
174. Id. at 221, 463 A.2d at 326. The Bruzzese court criticized the SUbjective stan
dard for being costly and impractical. The court stated that "[w]ere the Court to adopt the
defendant's SUbjective rule, practically every search-and-seizure case would require the
court to engage in a costly and time-consuming expedition into' the state of mind" of the
law enforcement officers. Id. The court also observed that motives are "seldom apparent
or vocalized" and that there is usually little practical evidence of them. Id. The Bruzzese
court also decided that the result of the establishment of a subjective test would be that
"each case would be as unique as the individual officer's thoughts. In short, the law would
become as unfathomable as the policeman's motives themselves." Id. at 222, 463 A.2d at
326-27.
175. Id. at 226, 463 A.2d at 329.
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should not be relied on to invalidate the search.' "176 This second lim
itation on the objective test is based not on the need to deter police
misconduct, but on the need to protect the integrity of the judicial
system.
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule is deter
rence.177 To a point, the deterrence rationale works well with the ob
jective test. 178 If the arresting officers act in a way that is obviously
unreasonable, the objective test will identify that arrest as a violation
of the fourth amendment, and the exclusionary rule will suppress the
evidence.
Reliance on the deterrence rationale as a justification for the ob
jective test, however, sometimes prevents the objective test from pro
tecting fourth amendment rights. 179 For example, if the purpose of
the objective test is to deter illegal conduct, the objective test has no
application in cases involving pretextual arrests because, in pretextual
arrests cases, the officers' conduct is itselflegal. 18o As one court noted,
"Since evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is sup
pressed in order to deter unlawful actions by police officers, the exclu
sionary rule need not be applied when officers act in a lawful manner,
even if they possess additional motives."181
However, as the Bruzzese decision shows, deterrence is not the
176. Id. at 227, 463 A.2d at 329 (quoting State v. Guerra, 93 N.J. 146, 152,459 A.2d
1159, 1162 (1983)).
177. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,916,930-41 (1984) ("[T]he exclusionary
rule is designed to deter police misconduct."). See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) The Ex
clusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16
CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 599 n.210 (1983) ("[T]he 'deterrence' rationale is of relatively
recent vintage." Kamisar suggests that the rule should not be grounded on an empirical
basis.); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusion
ary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1374-75 (1981) ("[I]n almost every case after Linkletter con
cerning the scope of the exclusionary rule, considerations of deterrence guided the
Court.").
178. It should be noted that some authorities question the effectiveness of the deter
rence rationale. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,450-52 n.22 (1976) ("No empiri
cal researcher, proponent or opponent of the rule, has yet been able to establish with any
assurance whether the rule has a deterrent effect. ").
179. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,918 (1984) ("We have frequently ques
tioned whether the exclusionary rule can have any deterrent effect when the offending of
ficers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. ").
180. Id. at 919.
181. People v. Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297, 523 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (1988).
See Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916-18 (1984) ("[E]ven assuming that the rule effectively deters
some police misconduct and provides incentives for the law enforcement profession as a
whole to conduct itself in accord with the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be expected, and
should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.").
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only rationale underlying the exclusionary rule. 182 The Supreme
Court observed in Dunaway v. New York that "there is another consid
eration-the imperative of judicial integrity"-which serves as an al
ternative justification for the exclusionary rule. 183 In addition, in
United States v. Payner,184 the Court said "[t]he Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule ... is applied in part 'to protect the integrity of the
court, rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the
defendant.' "185
The original justification for the exclusionary rule probably was
not deterrence. 186 In Weeks v. United States,187 the case that intro
duced the exclusionary rll;le, the Supreme Court never referred to de
terrence. On the contrary, the decision of the Supreme Court
suggested that the Court was concerned with the effect of admitting
the evidence on the reputation of the Court and the Constitution 
"[t]o sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision
a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution." 188 Only since Wolf v. Colorado,189 thirty-five years
later, has the notion of deterrence been advanced as a justification for
the exclusionary rule. 190 The deterrence rationale steadily gained ac
ceptance until it became established as the primary reason for the ex
clusionary rule.
While it is true that "judicial integrity" is not currently used as an
independent basis for excluding evidence, it can be used as a factor in
balancing the costs and benefits of admitting evidence. 191 It is submit
ted that in cases of pretextual arrests, the purpose of the fourth
amendment is better served by applying the rationales ofjudicial integ
182. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 223,463 A.2d 320, 329 (1983).
183. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979) (illegal evidence undermines court's integrity); Brown v. Illinois,
422 U.S. 590, 599 (1975) (discussing the basis of the exclusionary rule, "[t]hese considera
tions of deterrence and of judicial integrity, by now, have become rather commonplace.").
See also Schroeder, The Exclusionary Rule, 61 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1372-73 nn.72-76 (1981).
184. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
185. Id. at 736 n.8. (quoting the dissent at 747).
186. See Kamisar, supra note 177, at 598 n.21O.
187. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
188. Id. at 394. Note that in Lefkowitz, the first Supreme Court case to ban evidence
from pretextual arrests, the Court did not mention deterrence but focused instead on the
need to protect individual liberties. 285 U.S. 452, 464-67 (1932). See Schroeder, supra note
183, at 1371 n.70. See supra notes 16-17 for a discussion of Lefkowitz.
189. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
190. See Kamisar, supra note· 177, at 598 n.21O.
191. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 441 (1974).
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rity and deterrence together, rather than by relying on the deterrence
rationale alone.
For example, courts criticize the objective test as unjust because
law enforcement officers succeed in "a scheme to evade the fourth
amendment."192 The judicial integrity rationale provides a basis for
excluding such evidence, not because of improper motives, but because
the result of admitting the evidence calls into question the integrity of
the judiciary.
This note, therefore, proposes a two-step approach based on the
strict objective test and the judicial integrity rationale. The first step
would be the strict objective test. The strict objective test is simple to
apply and effectively screens out any obviously illegal non-pretextual
arrests. The second part of the proposed approach is to apply a sepa
rate balancing test based on the judicial integrity doctrine. 193 The two
factors to be balanced are the benefits to society from admitting the
evidence and the costs to the integrity of the judicial system. Usually
the benefits will include the fact that the evidence is very incriminating
and will greatly assist the jury in the search for truth. 194 This phe
nomenon m~y be especially true for voluntary confessions or perhaps
physical evidence uncovered during a search. The costs, however, can
be very important also. If the judicial system appears to condone cyni
cally manipUlative actions on the part of law officers, the integrity of
the entire legal system is threatened. In State v. Novembrino,195 the
court noted: "'Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example ...
If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law.
, "196
This proposed test avoids the pitfalls associated with the modified
objective approach because it does not depend on an analysis of police
motives. The integrity of the judiciary is not directly threatened by
192. United States v. Causey, 818 F.2d 354, 362 (1987).
193. Balancing tests have been previously proposed for exclusionary rule questions.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (exclusionary rule questions must be
"resolved by weighing the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable evidence versus consti
tutional rights. "); Burkhoff, supra note 153, at 268 (suggesting balancing "society's interest
in seeing the officer make each arrest" against "the societal interest in preserving fourth
amendment safeguards").
194. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) ("[A]ny apparent limitation
upon the process of discovering truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon the
basis of considerations which outweigh the general need for untrammeled discovery of
competent and relevant evidence in a court of justice.").
195. 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
196. Id. at 101, 519 A.2d at 823 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
485 (1938) (Brandeis, J., dissenting».
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improper police thoughts. The integrity of the courts is threatened by
facially valid police actions that appear to be deliberate manipulations
of the law. For the purposes of the second phase, it is not important
whether the police do or do not entertain improper motives. What is
important is that the actions of law enforcement officers cannot appear
to be so egregiously manipulative that the courts would be considered
tacit partners in unseemly conduct were the evidence admitted.
Applied to the facts of Causey, the first step of the proposed test
would find the actions of the arresting officers objectively reasonable
because the arrest was carried out under a valid warrant. The arrest,
however, would probably not pass the second step for two reasons.
First, the Baton Rouge police testified that they were uninterested in
pursuing the minor charge. While this fact is unimportant to a strict
objective analysis, it is very important to a judicial integrity analysis.
If the courts permit law enforcement officers to use evidence from ar
rests which they have publicly admitted were pretexts, the integrity of
and respect for the judicial system are endangered. The second reason
that the Causey arrest fails the proposed standard is because the of
ficers' actions were a blatant attempt to avoid the restrictions of the
Constitution. The Causey I court considered the arrest to be as repre
hensible as an act of "brutality." 197 The Causey II dissent found that
the actions of the police were "absolutely without precedent" in the
jurisdiction. 198 Whether or not the officers were thinking illegal
thoughts, their actions, taken as a whole, shocked members of the
court. 199 The judicial sanction of actions of this type brings the courts
into disrepute by association.
CONCLUSION

In United States v. Scott, the Supreme Court replaced the subjec
tive test with an objective standard that permits evidence to be admit
ted from an arrest if the actions of the law enforcement officers are
facially legal. Several courts have criticized the objective test because
it allows law enforcement officers to use minor infractions of the laws
as a means of violating the fourth amendment. The Causey I court
attempted to apply Scott in a way that avoided this result. This modi
fication of the objective test has not gathered support in the courts
197. 818 F.2d at 362-63.
198. 834 F.2d at 1187.
199. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1043 (7th Cir. 1989) (Ripple, J.,
concurring) (courts should suppress evidence from pretextual arrests that pass the objective
test if "police action, taken as a totality, violates the fourth amendment").
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because it is contrary to the principles of the Scott decision and be
cause it requires courts to condemn law enforcement conduct that is
legal on its face. The proposals advanced by academic commentators
have likewise been rejected because they are either impractical to ap
ply or fail to prevent police misconduct.
One solution to the unjust results of applying the objective test is
to create a new standard based both on the need to deter improper law
enforcement behavior and the need to preserve the reputation of the
courts. This standard is not contrary to Scott but instead builds upon
it. The proposed standard also does not require courts to engage in a
vain search for the motives of arresting officers, but allows the courts
to suppress evidence when the integrity of the judicial system is
threatened by egregious misconduct. By including in the test criteria
an analysis based upon judicial integrity, courts will simultaneously
protect both the fourth amendment rights of suspects and society'S
interest in the legitimacy of its legal system.
Robert D. Snook

